H.J.Res.54

Proposing an amendment to the Constitution of the United States providing that the rights protected and extended by the Constitution are the rights of natural persons only.

Introduced·2/12/25

Overview

This joint resolution proposes a constitutional amendment that would fundamentally restructure the relationship between artificial entities and the United States Constitution. The amendment's central objective is to confine constitutional rights and privileges exclusively to natural persons, thereby stripping corporations, limited liability companies, and other artificial entities of any constitutional protections they currently enjoy under existing judicial interpretation. Beyond redefining the scope of constitutional personhood, the resolution directly targets the role of money in elections by empowering all levels of government to regulate, limit, or prohibit political contributions and expenditures, and by explicitly prohibiting courts from treating the spending of money to influence elections as protected speech under the First Amendment. The amendment represents a direct legislative response to Supreme Court jurisprudence — most notably Citizens United v. FEC — that has treated corporate political spending as constitutionally protected expression. A carve-out preserves freedom of the press, ensuring that media organizations retain their First Amendment protections notwithstanding the broader restrictions on artificial entities.

Legal References

  • Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, 558 U.S. 310 (2010)
  • First Amendment, U.S. Constitution
  • U.S. Constitution, Article V (amendment ratification process)

Core Provisions

Section 1 of the proposed amendment establishes that only natural persons hold constitutional rights and privileges. Artificial entities — including corporations and limited liability companies — are explicitly excluded from constitutional protection and are declared fully subject to regulation by the people through Federal, State, or local law. Critically, any privileges afforded to artificial entities are to be determined by law and are not to be construed as inherent or inalienable, a direct repudiation of the doctrine of corporate constitutional personhood that has developed through case law over more than a century. Section 2 grants Federal, State, and local governments affirmative authority to regulate, limit, or prohibit contributions and expenditures in the political process for the purpose of ensuring equal access regardless of economic status. Governments are further required to mandate public disclosure of all permissible contributions and expenditures. Most significantly, Section 2 directs the judiciary to refrain from construing the spending of money to influence elections as speech protected by the First Amendment, effectively overturning the constitutional foundation of Citizens United and related decisions. Section 3 carves out an explicit protection for freedom of the press, ensuring that the amendment does not abridge press freedoms secured elsewhere in the Constitution.

Key Points

  • Constitutional rights and privileges are limited exclusively to natural persons [§1]
  • Artificial entities have no constitutional rights and are subject to full governmental regulation [§1]
  • Privileges of artificial entities are statutory, not inherent or inalienable [§1]
  • All levels of government may regulate, limit, or prohibit political contributions and expenditures [§2]
  • Public disclosure of permissible contributions and expenditures is mandated [§2]
  • Courts are prohibited from treating electoral spending as First Amendment speech [§2]
  • Freedom of the press is expressly preserved [§3]

Legal References

  • First Amendment, U.S. Constitution
  • U.S. Constitution, Article V
  • Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, 558 U.S. 310 (2010)
  • Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976)
  • Santa Clara County v. Southern Pacific Railroad, 118 U.S. 394 (1886)

Implementation

Implementation of this amendment, upon ratification by three-fourths of the several States as required by Article V of the Constitution, would fall to Federal, State, and local governments acting within their respective jurisdictions. Congress would bear primary responsibility for enacting enabling legislation to define the scope of permissible regulation of contributions and expenditures, establish disclosure frameworks, and set enforcement mechanisms. State legislatures would similarly need to enact or revise campaign finance laws to conform to and exercise the new authority granted by the amendment. The amendment does not specify a timeline for implementing legislation, nor does it designate a particular federal agency to administer disclosure requirements, leaving those structural decisions to subsequent legislative action. The public disclosure mandate in Section 2 creates a concrete reporting obligation that will require administrative infrastructure at both the federal and state levels. The Committee on the Judiciary in the House of Representatives holds initial jurisdiction over the resolution, and any implementing legislation would likely flow through that committee as well.

Legal References

  • U.S. Constitution, Article V
  • 52 U.S.C. § 30101 et seq. (Federal Election Campaign Act)
  • 11 C.F.R. (Federal Election Commission regulations)

Impact

The primary beneficiaries of this amendment are natural persons — individual citizens — whose political participation would no longer be diluted by constitutionally protected corporate spending. By removing the constitutional shield from corporate political expenditures, the amendment would restore to Congress and state legislatures the full authority to enact comprehensive campaign finance reform that has been foreclosed by Supreme Court rulings. The practical effect would be to permit reinstatement of contribution and expenditure limits on corporations, unions, and other artificial entities that were struck down under the First Amendment. The amendment would impose significant compliance burdens on corporations and other artificial entities currently engaged in political spending, as their activities would become subject to whatever regulatory regime Congress and state legislatures choose to enact. The disclosure requirements would increase transparency in campaign finance, providing voters with more complete information about the sources of political spending. There are no direct appropriations or cost estimates specified in the resolution, though implementation of disclosure infrastructure and enforcement mechanisms would require federal and state administrative resources. The amendment has no sunset provision and would become a permanent feature of the constitutional order upon ratification.

Legal References

  • Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, 558 U.S. 310 (2010)
  • McCutcheon v. Federal Election Commission, 572 U.S. 185 (2014)
  • 52 U.S.C. § 30118 (corporate and labor organization contributions and expenditures)

Legal Framework

This resolution operates as a proposed constitutional amendment under Article V of the Constitution, the highest form of legislative action available to Congress. As such, it does not require presidential approval and takes effect only upon ratification by three-fourths of the states. The amendment is designed to supersede existing constitutional doctrine, particularly the line of Supreme Court cases that extended First Amendment protections to corporate political spending. By embedding the restriction on judicial interpretation directly into the constitutional text — specifically directing that electoral spending shall not be construed as speech under the First Amendment — the amendment forecloses future judicial reinterpretation and removes the issue from the domain of ordinary statutory or regulatory action. The press freedom carve-out in Section 3 reflects a deliberate effort to preserve the distinct constitutional status of the press while eliminating broader corporate constitutional rights, though the boundary between press entities and other corporate entities may itself become a subject of litigation. The amendment would preempt any contrary state constitutional provisions to the extent they purport to grant artificial entities rights beyond what Federal, State, or local law authorizes, though it simultaneously expands state legislative authority to regulate in this space. The amendment does not provide for judicial review of its own provisions, but disputes over its application — including the definition of natural persons, artificial entities, and the scope of the press exemption — would inevitably be resolved through federal court litigation.

Legal References

  • U.S. Constitution, Article V
  • First Amendment, U.S. Constitution
  • Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, 558 U.S. 310 (2010)
  • Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976)
  • First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978)
  • McCutcheon v. Federal Election Commission, 572 U.S. 185 (2014)
  • Santa Clara County v. Southern Pacific Railroad, 118 U.S. 394 (1886)

Critical Issues

The most significant constitutional concern is the amendment's direct instruction to the judiciary regarding constitutional interpretation — specifically, the directive that courts shall not construe electoral spending as First Amendment speech. While constitutional amendments can override prior judicial interpretations, the precise scope of this directive raises questions about whether it applies only to artificial entities or could be read to restrict natural persons' ability to spend money on political speech, a right that has been independently recognized in Buckley v. Valeo. The boundary between protected press freedom under Section 3 and prohibited corporate political spending under Sections 1 and 2 presents a major implementation challenge, as many media corporations are artificial entities whose political commentary and endorsements could be characterized as either press activity or electoral spending. Opponents will argue that the amendment fundamentally undermines free speech principles by allowing government to suppress political communication based on the identity of the speaker, and that the press carve-out creates an unjustifiable distinction between favored and disfavored speakers. The definition of 'artificial entity' is not provided in the resolution, creating potential ambiguity about whether nonprofit advocacy organizations, political parties, labor unions, and other non-corporate entities fall within its scope. The amendment's grant of authority to regulate contributions and expenditures to ensure 'equal access' introduces an equality-based rationale for campaign finance regulation that is broader than the anti-corruption rationale previously accepted by the Supreme Court, which could generate litigation over the permissible scope of regulation. Finally, the ratification threshold of three-fourths of the states represents a formidable political obstacle, and the amendment's broad implications for corporate law and political activity will generate substantial organized opposition from business interests.

Legal References

  • Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976)
  • Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, 558 U.S. 310 (2010)
  • First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978)
  • First Amendment, U.S. Constitution
  • U.S. Constitution, Article V

Where it stands

Current
Judiciary Committee
Next
Committee decision

Sponsors

Democratic CaucusRepublican Caucus

History

Feb 12, 2025

House

Introduced in House

Feb 12, 2025

House

Referred to the House Committee on the Judiciary.